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


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
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THE
CONDUCT
OF THE
OPPOSITION,

And the TENDENCY of
Modern Patriotism, &c.



(Price One Shilling.)

THE
CONDUCT
OF THE
OPPOSITION,
AND THE
TENDENCY
OF

Modern Patriotism,

(More particularly in a late Scheme
to Establish a MILITARY GOVERN-
MENT in this Country)

Review'd and Examin'd.

Nolumus Leges Angliæ mutari.

L O N D O N :

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T H E
C O N D U C T
O F T H E
O P P O S I T I O N , &c.

rofessions of Fairness and Impartiality are such worn-out Prefaces to all polemical Writings, and more particularly to political Dissertations, that I shall neither give my self nor my Readers the Trouble of any Exordium of that Kind ; having neither so good an Opinion of my own Ingenuity, nor so ill a one of their Discernment, as to imagine I can persuade them to believe there is Candour where it is not, or that they will want any Light but its own to distinguish it where it is.

All I shall say, is, that notwithstanding most Authors at present seem to write, as if Calumny and Flattery divided the whole World, and that Truth had so few Followers that no body could represent any thing but as their Prejudices conceive it, or their Interest induces them to describe it; notwithstanding Authors seem to concern themselves so much more about Persons than Things, and about the private Characters of Transactors, than the publick Utility, or Detriment of their Transactions; notwithstanding, I say, the almost universal Prevalence of these epidemical Errors, as I am sure I can disapprove the Measures of some Classes of Men, without feeling Rancour to any of the Individuals that compose them, so I flatter my self I can love the Persons of others, and esteem their private Character, without being by-
 as'd to think differently of their publick Behaviour, than I should do without those Attachments.

And when I declare against all Personalities, against the too frequent Practice of mis-stating Facts, declaiming to the Passions of the People, and endeavouring to blind their Reason rather than enlighten it,

I must leave the World to judge, whether I fall into the Errors I condemn, or set an Example of the Conduct I would recommend.

That the Freedom of this Country is the Basis of its Prosperity, and consequently what ought to be the primary Consideration of all those concern'd in framing its Laws, is a Proposition on which I am ready to join Issue with those who are the loudest Advocates for Liberty, and pretend to be the stoutest Champions in its Cause ; but the two great Points so often asserted, and so generally inculcated by the Opposition, which are, that they themselves are constantly at Work in the Support and Defence of our Liberties, and those they oppose, as constantly endeavouring to undermine them ; these two are Points to which I can never agree : And in order to give my Reasons for dissenting, I shall, in the first Place, examine, whether every Step lately taken by the *Opposition* has tended to the Maintenance of Liberty, or to the Introduction of such Confusion as could only settle at last in the absolute Destruction of all Liberty in this Country.

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In the next Place I shall consider, whether any one Measure of the present Administration has either directly attack'd, or indirectly weaken'd our Liberties ; and whether this Country does not enjoy them at this Day in as full Extent as it ever did, in the most free and prosperous *Æra* that can be mark'd out in the History of this Government, from its earliest Infancy to the present Hour.

And as nothing can conduce farther towards manifesting the Sincerity of these *Opponents*, when they declare the Interest of their Country is all they have at Heart ; or if they sincerely wish it, how perfectly well they understand it ; I shall now endeavour to display in its genuine Colours the last Proof they have given of this Zeal for Liberty in their *military Project* ; from whence the whole World may see how little these Patriot-Parents, of a Tyrant-Child, either knew what their Offspring in Maturity must prove ; or if they did know, how little their Schemes and Actions tally with their Words and Writings, their Conduct with their Professions, or the Titles they deserve with those they assume.

But

But before I examine this *Project*, with Regard to the great Support and Security it would be to the Liberties of this Country, I cannot help making some cursory Reflexions on the great Decency and Justice shown by these *Projectors* on this Occasion to the Crown; as well as their consummate Wisdom, Judgment and Sagacity, in imagining this *Project* would tend to the ingratiating of the *Projectors* to the People, and to the Advancement of that *Popularity* which, in all their Measures and Proceedings, they so diligently court and pompously affect.

Nor can I help observing how likely a Road it must be to lead them to that *Goal*, unnecessary to name, which they ever have in View; to which every Step they take is design'd to lead, and which secretly animates all the different Warmth they show either of real Enmity to those they oppose, or pretended Friendship to those they would seem to protect.

To point out the Decency and Justice observed to the King in this Proposal, it is only necessary to reflect what Right the King has to this Power of displacing Off-
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cers, how long the Crown has been in Possession of it; and if the only Inference that can be drawn, from the Desire of taking a Power from the reigning Prince which every one of his Predecessors enjoy'd, is not this, that there never sat a Prince upon this Throne, who was so unfit to be trusted with that Authority.

As to the Right the King has to this Power, it is indisputably the same with that he has to his Crown; as it is a Power inherent in the Crown, from, I believe, the earliest Establishment of Monarchy in this Island; one that in the most limited Reigns was never attempted to be separated from the regal Authority; and a Power thought so necessary to be in the Crown, that even at that Time, when the Act of Settlement was under Consideration, when every Power of the Crown that could be held dangerous to the Liberties of the People was clog'd and fetter'd; when every Branch of the Prerogative that was thought detrimental to the Constitution, and to engross too much of that Sap that should go to the Support and Nourishment of the whole Tree, was clip'd and prun'd: Even at this Time, in all the Limitations made to the Power of the Crown, this was
one

one never thought proper either to be abolished or abridg'd.

In Answer to this these *Projectors* say, that although it is a Power that ever has been in the Crown, it is one so dangerous to the Liberties of the People, that it ought never to have been lodg'd there, since a Prince, by garbling and modelling the Army according to his own Arbitrary Pleasure, (that is by putting out Men proper for the Service of the Army, and putting improper Men in) will have it in his Power so to fashion the Army, that the Troops given for the Defence of the Kingdom may one Time or other be turn'd to the Ruin of it.

But whatever People may write or say in this rambling Manner, it is only writing plausibly or talking popularly; it is declaiming on Generals, but proving nothing in particular; and is rather descanting on the Nature of all Power, than adapting their Reasoning to the present Purpose; for wherever Power is, no Doubt it is liable to Abuse; consequently it can never require much Art in any Set of Men to prepossess the Ignorant, amuse the Credulous, and alarm the Timid with Apprehensions

and Fears of such possible Abuses, even when there is not the least real Foundation given for Suspensions or Jealousies of those Abuses being made or intended.

Nor can it be an Argument, because Power may be abused wherever it is lodged, that therefore it must be lodg'd nowhere ; for as no Society can be form'd or preserv'd without superior Power placed some where, so if Society be a Benefit to Mankind, the Consideration of the Wise, the Well-meaning, and the Prudent, will not be to make *that* perfect which is incapable of Perfection, or to form a System of Government not liable to Abuse ; they will not employ their Time in a chimerical Pursuit of a Place to lodge Authority where there is no Danger, but in the Choice of that Place where there will be least.

And with Regard to the Case now under Consideration, where can we think this Power of displacing Officers least dangerous, but in those Hands to which the Wisdom of our earliest Ancestors did consign it, and where their Posterity, unhurt, have left it to this Day.

Yet

Yet supposing what I am far from believing ; that, from a Spirit of Innovation, a Propensity to Novelty, and a Thirst for Change, the Majority of the Kingdom were for trying this dangerous Experiment ; supposing they did wish to lop from the Crown this great Branch of its Prerogative ; on what wise Motive could they go about it, or by what equitable Method could they ever effect it ? they could never do the one with Prudence, or the other with Justice ; for Prudence would as little attempt so material an Innovation in the Constitution, meerly from the Apprehension of imaginary Dangers, which the Experience of so many Ages had not found fatal, as Justice could warrant either the People or the Parliament's resuming from the Crown an Authority placed there in all Reigns, confirmed by the Act of Settlement, and which upon that Resumption would not be vested in the People, but in the Officers of the Army.

And here in Truth lies the great Objection to all the general Reasonings on the just Rights of the Crown and the People when applied to this Question ; That this Project gives not to the People a Power
taken

taken from the Crown, but places it in the Army independent of both.

When therefore the *Habeas Corpus Act*, the *Bill of Rights*, and the Case of *making the Judges for Life*, are quoted to support this Measure, as Points gain'd upon the Crown, they are no Parallels to the present Question.

The *Habeas Corpus Act* was pass'd in King *Charles* the Second's Reign, upon many crying and notorious Instances of illegal Imprisonments and Commitments of the Subject, without being brought to Tryal; and was made to protect the People against grievous and known Abuses. But this *military Scheme* to abridge the Power of the Crown, was in Favour of the *Officers of the Army* only, and with fewer Instances of the Exercise of that Power, than was ever known in any other Reign: Nor could the civil Subject be benefited, but on the contrary would be prejudiced by this Measure, as the Check, which the civil Power of the Crown now has on the military Power of the Officers, would have been transferred to the Officers themselves; and consequently, like all other Checks when in the same Hands, with that Power on which they are Checks,

Checks, would have become no Check at all.

The Bill of Rights that was pass'd after the Revolution, upon a Change of Government, was to remedy the Mischiefs that made the Revolution necessary, and to settle the Conditions of the new Government in such a Manner as to prevent the same Excesses for the Future : Nor was it made in Favour of a particular Sett of Men to create a dangerous Independency in one Class, where Independency would be more dangerous than it could be in any other, but to procure just Rights and Privileges for the whole Body of the People, for the Nation in general, and to lighten the Weight of the Civil Government, not to add to that of a Military one.

To make either of these Instances therefore parallel to the present Case, it must be proved, that the Officers are now as much oppress'd as the whole Nation was in King *Charles*, and King *James's* Reigns ; and that this Project was as conducive to the national Good, as the *Habeas Corpus* Act, and the Bill of Rights.

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The Case of the Judges ought also to be consider'd in a very different Light, as it was a Provision made for the Securities of the Lives, Liberties, and Properties of all the People. The Judges determine in all Cases not only between Subject and Subject, but between the Crown and the People: God forbid the Officers of the Army should ever come to be such Arbitrators; but the Judges being so, whilst they held their Places during the Pleasure only of the Crown, all that is valuable to us was precarious; and this Point was immediately the Cause of the People; those who say this Scheme is equally so, and that the Case of the Officers is similar to that of the Judges, must therefore affirm, that the Army is as essential to our Constitution, as the Execution of the Laws of the Land; that those who preside over the one, should be as independent of the Crown, as those who administer the other; that they are both of equal Consequence, and ought both to be equally permanent.

There is another Circumstance that essentially prevents the Case of the Judges from being any Parallel to the present Case, at least with Regard to the Respect shewn to the Crown when that Point was obtain'd; which

which is, that when that Act pass'd to make the Judges Places, *quam diu se bene gesserint*, it was not, (as I have been inform'd) absolutely to take away a formerly allowed Power in the Crown, but to settle and ascertain a disputable litigated Part of the Prerogative; and even in this Instance so much Respect and Regard at least were shewn to the Prince then upon the Throne, that this Act was not to take Place during his Life, but to leave the Prerogative of the present Possessor just upon the same Foot it then was.

Which Provision was no Part, as I ever heard, of the present *Project*; nor indeed, if it had, would it have made the *Project* a *less* Evil to the Constitution, tho' a more *remote* one; or a less destructive *Project* for the People, tho' it might have soften'd the Harshness of its Countenance towards *the King*.

As to the Anecdote of a great Lord and Minister, who offer'd this Thing to be done in the late Reign, which these modern Projectors quote as their Justification now: In the first Place, I much doubt the Fact; but if true, it is the strongest Thing that can be urg'd against the present Projectors Conduct,

duct, either with Regard to the King or the People; with Regard to the King, because the Consent of the King in the late Reign was supposed to be previously asked; which, I believe, was not the Case now; and with Regard to the People, this Example is far from justifying the Revival of this Project; since, if this Offer was formerly made and not accepted, in all Probability, it was, because the Whigs of those Days, and those who fear'd an Army most, thought the Power of displacing Officers would be infinitely more dangerous in a Court Martial than in the Crown; and that the making an Army dependent only on itself, would never tend to the making it less formidable; consequently that this Abridgment of the Prerogative would have been lessening the Power of the Crown, without adding to the Security of the Liberties of the People; and instead of keeping the Balance between these two Scales, would be throwing a Weight into a Third, that would have turn'd the other two.

The second Light in which I propos'd to consider this Project, was with Regard to its *Popularity*, and the Degree in which it would contribute to the Preservation of the Constitution, and the Maintenance of Liberty.

And

And if it is popular to propose erecting a fourth Power in the Constitution, independent of the other three; or rather to lay the Foundation of a Power to subvert the other three: If it is popular to say that, let Officers enter into what Cabals, or form what Plots against the Government they think fit, their Crimes shall be cognizable only to a Court Martial, and consequently punishable only by one another: If it is popular so to constitute the Army, that whatever Violences they commit, or whatever Crimes they are guilty of, their Commissions shall always be looked upon as unalienable Pieces of Property, unless taken from them by Members of their own Fraternity, and those Members perhaps Associates in their licentious Practices, and Accomplices of their Crimes: If it is popular so to regulate the Forces raised for the Service of the State, that they shall be as dangerous to the State, as the Enemies from which they are to guard it; and that it shall be a Moot-Point, whether it is best to leave the Kingdom defenceless against foreign Invaders, or exposed to as great Dangers from its domestic Defenders: In a Word, if it would be popular to make the Officers of the Army the Masters of the

State instead of the Servants of the State; this *Project* might lay a juster Claim to Popularity than any yet ever formed or proposed. But if a Project to weaken every present Power subsisting in our Constitution; and to substitute in their Room a Power known but once in this Kingdom, then felt with Calamity, Anarchy, and Confusion; and ever since remember'd with Horror and Deprecation: If a Project to renew such Times deserves any hard Title or Character, this sure might be rank'd with the most pernicious that ever enter'd into a weak Head or a bad Heart.

That this *Project*, if it had passed into a Law, would have made the Army more independent than it now is, no One, I believe, will dispute; tho' how far that Independency would have gone, and what Effects it would have had, may perhaps be more problematical.

But if any Judgment is to be form'd from the general Probability of future Events, or from the universal Example of past Times in similar Cases, this *Project* must have terminated in the entire Subversion of our present Form of Government,
and

and the Establishment of the worst of all Slavery, which is that of a *Stratocracy*, a military Synod, arbitrarily dictating and cruelly executing their own Laws, without Controul, Redress, or Appeal.

I have the greatest Respect imaginable for the present Officers of the Army, they are most of them Men of Birth, many of them Men of Fortune, and all of my Acquaintance at least among them, Men of the nicest Honour and strictest Integrity: But as Power, like Avarice, is of a Nature incapable of Satiety, and that the grossest Food that can be given to it, instead of blunting, generally quickens it's Appetite, so it is not to be doubted but the future Officers of the Army, like all other Fraternities, would, after this Accession of Power, have endeavoured to stretch their Authority still farther, and to make the rest of the Kingdom feel that Controul from which they themselves were freed: Since the most natural Step for Mankind to take, after shaking off their own Dependence, is to impose it on others; nor can any Transition be more easy or more frequent, than from ceasing to obey, to begin to govern.

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The King, after this Law had been made, would not have been able, on the justest Suspicions of Disaffection to his Government, without communicating them to a Court Martial, to have removed any one Officer from his Post; though his Intelligence had been of a Nature that he had not the least Reason to doubt the Truth of it; and yet such, that the revealing it might be of the utmost Consequence.

And in this Situation what must the King have done? He must either have discovered to the whole World what was of the greatest Importance to him to conceal, or often kept among the Guards to his Person and the Defenders of his Government, Men whom he knew to be in Plots and Cabals to destroy the one, and overturn the other.

One might suppose many Cases where Proof sufficient for a Court Martial to break an Officer could not be made, and yet such Evidence there might be against him, or at least such strong Suspicion, that a Prince would not only be thoroughly justifiable in removing him, but guilty perhaps

haps of the greatest Imprudence if he did not.

To this it has been answered, that *in such Cases the King might send him upon Posts where he would be less dangerous*: But the *Ridicule* of such an Answer is too strong for any Body that repeats it, to think it can be necessary seriously to refute it; or that every Reader must not anticipate all one can say to point out the *Absurdity* of so weak a Defence.

But I will go still farther, and suppose the Evidence against this disaffected Officer even strong enough for him to deserve Condemnation from a Court Martial; I will suppose it too to be Evidence of the greatest Crime an Officer can be guilty of, which is *Treason*; and yet I should be far from sure that, even in this Case, he would receive the Condemnation he merited from those Judges.

For where there is a disputed Title to the Crown, would it not be the Interest of an Independent Army always, if they could, to keep a dependent King? And if it would be their Interest, what could answer that End more effectually, than following

lowing the Example of the *Pretorian Cohorts* in the *Roman* Government, who constituted themselves always Umpires in the Disputes between the reigning Prince and the Pretender to the Throne, held the one in Fear, the other in Hope, both in Suspence, and made the Price of their Assistance to either, an Acknowledgment of holding the Crown by their Grace, Favour, and Support.

This was the Practice of the *Pretorian Bands* ; yet *Tacitus* tells us, that the Power, and Weight, our *Patriot Projectors* would give the *English* Army at setting out, was one which these *Romans* obtained the last.

For though *Sejanus*, who was plotting to depose the Prince, by whose ill-placed Favour he rose to that unmerited Grandeur he enjoy'd in the Commonwealth, was the first Man that chalk'd out the Path, and paved the Way to the absolute Sway these military Tyrants afterwards exercised in the Government ; yet it was not till the Time of the Contentions of *Otho* and *Vitellius*, that this finishing Stroke was given to their Authority, which was the *chusing their own Officers* : But when they

they gain'd that Point, these are the Words of *Tacitus*, — *Omnia deinde arbitrio Militum acta* ; Every thing afterward was transacted by the *Soldiery*.

It may perhaps be objected, that as this *Project* was not for giving the Army a Power to chuse their own Officers, what I have cited can be no Parallel to the present Case ; but as Mankind is so formed, that I fear the Generality of them turn their Eyes more towards those, whose Power in Futurity can alone support them, than to those whose Favour at first obliged them ; so it will easily I believe be acknowledged, that the giving a Court Martial the sole Power of putting Officers out, would amount to much the same thing as the allowing them the Power of putting them in.

Had this *Project* therefore for establishing such Discipline in *England* succeeded, I should rather have lamented than wondered, if in future Times, I had seen the *English* like the *Roman* *Soldiery*, dictating to an intimidated impotent Senate, deposing and crowning, making and unmaking Kings, at their Pleasure, plundering this populous and wealthy City to pay
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themselves, and laying the whole Country in Blood and Confusion, on the least Resistance offer'd to the oppressive Ordinances of their capricious lawless Will.

It cannot be denied, but that an Army, is in its Nature a Body, that must obey, or will command. And it is hard to justify Martial Law in an Army, but from the Necessity of some absolute Controul, arising from the Nature and Constitution of an Army. To punish Mutiny and Sedition therefore in the inferior and subaltern Members of the Army with Death or Cashiering, only to preserve Order and Discipline within the Army, and yet to leave an Army within the State, free and independent of the Crown, and not subject to such Controul, and Authority, as our Constitution, and the Wisdom of all Ages and Nations has ever found necessary, would be to give the Generals and Commanders of an Army, absolute Power over that Army, and leave the Nation subject to a most ungovernable, or rather (in the modern Stile) to the most *All-governing, All-dictating, All-directing, All-grasping, Power-ingrossing* Body of Men, that can be supposed to exist in any Nation.

I should be glad to reduce this Dispute to one Point, and ask, Whether it is not unavoidable, that the Military Power should be subject and dependent upon the Civil Power, or the Civil Power subservient to the Military, and which of the two Conditions is most consistent with a free Government? Are the Officers of State most liable to dispute Power and Jurisdiction with the Military Officers, or the Officers of the Army to interfere with the Officers of the State in their Sphere? Are the Officers of the Army more free from Ambition, Avarice, Malice, and all other Passions incident to human Nature, than the rest of Mankind? if they are not, is it impossible to suppose those Passions might instigate them to desire, and induce them to think themselves equal to the Management of all the Civil Government? Should that ever be the Case, is it impossible to suppose they might, transported by those Passions, pretend to dictate to their Sovereign, who shall, or shall not be Ministers of State; with whom they will, or will not serve? Has not this been done in

many Countries ? and should it ever be done here, what must the Prince in that Situation determine ? As the Law now stands, he may take his Choice, and support those Ministers, that he thinks serve him well and faithfully, and remove those Officers that presume to give him Law in Matters wholly foreign to their Province. But if those Officers can be removed only by the Judgment of themselves, the Ministers must be changed at the Will and Discretion of these Military Dictators : And if that happens, who must we suppose will succeed ? Would any thing less satisfy the Officers, than the Civil Power being put into their Hands, or would they ever cease to clamour and mutiny, till this Ambition was gratified, and these Views compleated ? And when they cannot forfeit their Military Commissions, which have forced them into the Civil Government, what shall controul them in either ? The Government is become Military, and King and People must by Degrees, and in certain Consequence, become dependent upon *Them*, who, by this notable Scheme, were to be made independent of both.

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The only Pretence for attempting this great Alteration in the Constitution, by making the Officers of the Army independent of the Crown, was to prevent the too great Influence of the Crown in Parliament, by the great Number of Officers of the Army, that are or may be Members of either House; and to protect the Officers of the Army from the Resentment of Ministers, for their Conduct and Behaviour in Parliament. Had this been the real Mischief, the natural Remedy had been to have made all Officers of the Army incapable of Sitting and Voting in either House of Parliament, or to have made their Commissions independent of the Crown during their Continuance in Parliament: But as this on one hand had been in Consequence an Exclusion of the Peerage from serving in the Army; or, on the other, a great Severity to some Officers of the Army, and too great a Distinction between the Officers of the Army that were or were not Members; so this no ways served the present Purpose: For the Army was now to be courted at the Expence of the Crown,

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(or at least the Officers) so far as to make the Military Power independent on the Civil ; which, in other Words, had been to make the Civil dependent upon the Military.

It would be tedious, if not endless, to try to enumerate half the Instances that might be given, of the Inconveniences and Fatality attending those Governments that have ever given Commands in their Armies for Life, or even for a Term of Years. The ancient Histories are full of them, and numberless the Examples, where the utmost Confusion immediately, and sovereign Power ultimately, has been the Consequence of such Grants.

The bestowing the Military Government of Provinces and Armies for a Term of Years, was the Ruin of the *Roman* Commonwealth ; nor is it possible indeed, in the natural Progress of Things, but that sovereign Power must follow the independent Command of unconquer'd Armies : The only Alternative therefore remaining to a People mad enough to trust their Generals
with

with such Command, is to become the Slaves of their Invader or their Defender.

Not a Century is yet pass'd, since we saw what Havock only an independent House of Commons made in this Kingdom: And if breaking the Balance of Power in this Constitution, by making a House of Commons *dissolvable* only by itself, could overturn all the other Parts of the Government; is it to be imagined, that a *Project* to make Officers *removeable* only by themselves, would not have produced as bad Effects? If the Independency of a Parliament (I mean an Independency not given by our Constitution) could bring Things into such Confusion, what Confusion might not be expected from the Independency of an Army? If the first, arm'd only by Votes and Resolutions, could tyrannize in that Manner, what might not be apprehended from the last, who would come arm'd with Fire and Sword? The Consequence would not be hard to guess, but may be plainly seen in the Effects of that independent Parliament delegating afterwards its Power to an inde-

independent Army, when the whole Kingdom became their Prey and their Slaves ; and those very Knaves and Fools, who had constituted the Power of that Army, were the first Sacrifices to the Outrages and Injustices committed in the Exercise of it.

If therefore the Scheme of these *great, wise, and honest Projectors* tended to constitute Independency in the Army ; and if Example as well as common Sense and Reason tell one, that such must have been the Consequence of that Independency : Let those who have been long dazzled by false Lights, alarm'd with false Fears, and led on by false Hopes ; who have been misguided by false Representations, and deceived by false Professions ; let those now see to what Centre, the little glimmering Rays of Patriotism that have shewn themselves hitherto, only in scatter'd, diffused Forms, are at last drawn and collected in their full Force, Lustre, and Glory : Let them behold to what Point their popular Champions would bring this Government, and what infinite Obligations they have to a Sett of *Innovators*,

tors, Reformers, and Projectors, who whilst they have nothing but the Preservation of the Constitution and the Liberties of the People in their Mouths; have nothing in View, or at Heart, but the Gratification of long disappointed Rage, private Piques, and particular Resentments; and which rather than not gratify, they would gratify at the Expence both of our Liberties and our Constitution.

And if, from what has been already said, it does manifestly appear how unwise, and imprudent it would be, ever to constitute an independent Army in this Country, I would be glad to be told by these *All-reforming Projectors*, how the Dependency of it can be better regulated, or more safely constituted, than in the Manner it is at present.

The Number of Troops is annually granted, and their Pay annually provided for by Parliament; the Officers, who are to command those Troops, are nominated and appointed by the Crown. And as that Power of appointing, or displacing Officers is absolutely vested in

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the King, so it is a discretionary Power, which he is to exercise, as his own Wisdom and Prudence shall direct; to none is he accountable for the Use of it, and to none indeed, by the Nature of this Power, is it possible he should be accountable. For to allow the Parliament a Right, to oblige him to give Reasons, for what he thinks expedient to be done when he exercises this Power, would in reality be taking the Power itself away; since if the Parliament were not to be Judges of the Validity of those Reasons they exacted, and he gave, and according as they approved or disapproved, confirm or reverse what he had done, the Communication of his Reasons for acting, would be to no End: And if the Parliament were to be Judges of the Validity of his Reasons, and accordingly confirm or reverse his Decrees; it would in effect be taking this Power of nominating Officers out of the Crown, and lodging it in the Parliament; whereas these two distinct Powers of limiting the Number of Troops that shall be kept up, and nominating those who shall command them, are two Powers, which the Wisdom,

dom of our Constitution has thought fit to divide, by vesting the one in the Parliament, the other in the Crown ; and since it has done so, for the Parliament to say, who shall be employed to command the Troops, would be as great an *Innovation* in our Constitution, as for the Crown to raise a greater Number than the Parliament had ordered to be levied.

Who then, after all the boasted Friendship, and sacred Reverence professed by the *modern Patriots* for our Constitution, are really the truest Friends to it, those, who under the Pretence of Reformation, but through a latent Desire to produce Confusion, or at best, from national experimental Systems, would make so material a Change in the Constitution ? Or those, who, preferring Practice and Experience to Theory and Speculation, desire to keep what they know to be good, rather than change for what they know nothing of ; who, conscious of the wise Structure of our Constitution, enjoying the Benefits of it, and acknowledging they cannot mend it, are for keeping it, in all its Parts, entire, and

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But to *such Whigs* this Project could never be pleasing; nor was it indeed better calculated to unite the *Tories*; for tho' one Class of Tories would, from an Inveteracy to the present Establishment of the Crown, be glad to wrest any Authority out of the Hands of him who enjoys it, and shake his Security, by making the Officers independent of him; yet we know there is another Party of Tories, who, zealous for the Prerogative abstractedly considered, would not consent to streighten and clip it, *let whose Head soever wear the Crown*; and there is still a third Class, who from sanguine, but, I hope, vain Hopes of the Day approaching, when they shall see the Crown on that Head they wish it, would perhaps be uneasy to have the Crown restored, with any of that Lustre diminished, which it boasted when it was lost.

To whom then was this Question palatable? Whose Taste was it made to fit? And whose Interest was it to serve? Theirs alone, whose Despair drives them to concert, abet, and assist all such Measures,

Measures, and such Measures only as may outrage Particulars, and distress the *Whole*, by producing Confusion. Such Men as fly to the poor Relief of teasing those whom they cannot wound ; and insulting the Power and Authority of a Prince not less invulnerable by their vain Resentment, than impregnable to their vain Flattery ; who hears the one, and saw through the other, with equal Contempt ; conscious of his own Merit in deserving the Affections of his People, and secure, from the eternal Prevalence of Truth, that he must, notwithstanding any temporary Diversion by the false Arts of a few, at last unite and possess them.

One who knows his own Strength, and understands his own Interest ; who is thoroughly sensible by what Party he *is* supported, and by what Party alone he *can* be supported ; who knows, that it is those Principles and that Conduct which laid the Foundation of his Establishment, that must maintain it ; such Principles, and such Men, as are equally solicitous to maintain the Rights of the Crown, the Privileges of Parliament,
and

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and the Liberties of the People ; that are for preserving these three great assistant and co-operating Springs on which this Government moves, in the same just, nice, and due Balance, in which the Revolution Principles, and the Act of Succession placed and poised them.

For to imagine that either *Tories*, or such *Whigs* as are now in League with Tories, ever would or could long maintain this Government, is extravagant and absurd ; for what can be more absurd than to suppose, that either a Revolution Government could be supported by Men of Anti-Revolution Principles, or that any Regal Authority at all could be supported by Men of Republican Principles ? Between this *Scylla* and *Charibdis*, this Jacobite and Republican-party, the present Government must then steer, in order to preserve a steady or secure Road : For as *the last*, by acting consistently with their Principles, would bring this Nation into the Confusion of *Forty-one* ; so *the former*, by preserving a Consistency in their Characters, would go near to produce an Event, that would put one more in
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Mind perhaps of the Year *Sixty* ; the *One*, if vested with Authority, would make Use of the Favour of the Crown, only in order to destroy the Power of it ; and *the Other*, with like Gratitude though from different Principles, receive the Benefaction, in order to undoe the Benefactor ; and, by a Sort of *Papistical Policy*, as the Bigots to that Religion think themselves under no Obligation to hold Faith, or observe Promises towards those whom they call Hereticks ; so would these *Papists in Politicks* think themselves bound, neither in Honour or Justice, (though ever so much obliged) to observe Faith with *one* whom they would call an *Usurper*. By the same Way of Thinking, and the same Indulgence, that they are now absolved (or by which they absolve themselves) from keeping solemn and publick Oaths, they would esteem themselves free from observing any the most solemn private Promises, Contract, or Covenant, that could be made ; they would hold it as meritorious to set every Tye and Consideration at Nought, that did not tend to the Service of him they call *the true King*, as the most blinded Bigots

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to *Popery* could think it, to break through all Engagements that did not tend to the Propagation of what *they* call *the true Faith*; those would no more hold League with Men they thought *Rebels*, than these with People they thought *Hereticks*; the *Jacobite Bigot* would esteem himself honourably a Knave to the one, as the Religious Bigot would prove conscientiously unjust to the others; whilst both of them, from an Affinity in their Way of Thinking, and concomitant Principles for their Rule of Acting, would make a Merit to their King and their God of that Perjury, Treachery, and Ingratitude, which less *loyal* and less *pious* Minds would start to think of.

That this would have been the Case even in the Reign of the late Queen, when Men of this honourable, wise, and virtuous Stamp were employed, I believe, no body that ever gave themselves Time to look forward into the Chain of the most natural Consequences, and the most probable Events, ever doubted.

When

When that weak unhappy Princess was prevailed upon to dismiss that great, able, and successful Man *her General*, with that upright Statesman and sagacious Politician *her Treasurer* ; when she had been prevailed upon, by changing her Administration, to leave herself destitute of Allies Abroad, and Friends at Home ; to shew both the one, and the other, how little the Steadiness of her Counsels, or her Favour, was to be depended upon : When the Whigs, by whom she was brought to the Throne, and by whom she was supported upon it, were discarded and disgraced : When the *Tories*, Enemies to her Title, and not Friends to her Person, were placed round the latter, and vested with Power to subvert the former : In short, when the Tories, at the latter End of that Reign, govern'd this Country, does any one think (whatever he may say) that *the then Ministry* was not determined to set aside that Succession, that by their Want of Time, and the Favour of Providence to this Land, has since taken Place : And if this was their Scheme and their View,

does any body imagine they could think themselves secure either of Success in that Design, or even in Safety in that Situation, without their *own Successor* upon the Spot? Or can any body believe, when they had brought him here, if her Majesty had not naturally, or unnaturally, slept with her Ancestors in *Westminster-Abbey*, that at least and at best this unfortunate Princess, this abused Mistress, this blinded Protectress, and ill requited Benefactress of these *faithful* Servants and *honest* Ministers, would not have been in the *Tower*, and their new *Idol* on the *Throne*.

And if this would have been the Conduct of the *Jacobite* Party, even towards a Branch of their own favourite Tree, a Branch too under which they received Shelter and Protection, what Outrage might not be expected from them towards any Shoot from a foreign Stock, to which they have been so long and such declared Enemies, that no body can doubt but they would be glad not only to lop a Branch, but to cut up the very Root, destroy all
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its fair and flourishing Fruits, and extirpate the very Seed out of the Land.

To try longer to impose that stale Cheat, and transparent Falshood, of alledging all the Opposition carry'd on against the present Government, to be level'd not at the *Prince*, but his *Minister*, would now be to no Purpose; it would be too gross to be received by the most credulous Ears, and too coarse not to be seen through by the blindest Eyes.

Whilst *the Opponents* had any Hopes of removing the Minister by approaching the King, it is very true that all their Shot was level'd at that single Mark; but when they despaired of gaining their Point that Way, and thought removing the King was the only Way to remove the Minister, the Tables were turn'd, and instead of collaterally hurting the Interest of the King, by imputing all his Measures to the Folly and Wickedness of an *ignorant, corrupt* Minister; they threw away the Mask and the Scale-
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bard, turn'd the Point of their Weapons directly to the King's own Breast, and endeavour'd to cast the same *Odium* and Ridicule on the Person and Character of the *Master*, that they had formerly done on those of the *Servant*.

Thus when his Majesty, notwithstanding all their Slander on his Minister, and *Encomiums* on themselves, happen'd not to be convinced, against Experience, of the Want of Ability and Integrity in one who had served him; or to be willing implicitly, and meerly on their own Recommendation, to trust to the Integrity and Ability of those who offer'd to serve him; when he took the unpardonable Liberty of chusing Servants for himself, and declining the Tender, these Gentlemen were pleas'd to make him of *their* Service; the Disappointment and Affront of this Refusal put them upon trying other Methods to obtain that Power they wanted, and seeing if they could not make him do that by Force, which they could not induce him to do by Choice.

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The Means employ'd to execute this wise and loyal Scheme, were *Distress* and *Clamour*, distressing his Measures Abroad, and raising Clamour in every Corner of the Kingdom at Home.

No just Handle being given for Complaint, supposed Handles were to be taken, and the whole Country to be blown up, by such monstrous Stories of Things being design'd, that were never thought of, and such extravagant Misrepresentations of what was really design'd and thought of, that even the Men, who endeavour'd to impose these Tales on the People in publick, laugh'd in private at the Folly and Credulity of those deluded Wretches, whose susceptible Fears took that Impression, which the Art and Falshood of their Deceivers had try'd to make upon their Minds.

But how little Knowledge must *the Opponents* have of the Steadiness and Resolution of the Prince, whom, by these Methods, they endeavour'd to stagger? How little must they be acquainted

quainted with his Disposition and Sentiments, to imagine that what the softer Means of Insinuation could not obtain, these rougher Applications of Outrage and Defiance would ever bring about? For besides the Temper of the Prince, they have to deal with, not being just of the likeliest Make to give Way to Attacks of this Nature ; his Judgment (as well as his Temper) must have been of the weakest Frame, for him not to discern the many and great Inconveniences, which a Compliance with the unreasonable Clamour they had raised, must necessarily have brought upon him.

A Prince, who changes his Administration by the Intrigues of the Court, and Cabals of the Palace, runs no Risque of weakening his Power, and has no Danger to apprehend from such a Change, but that of being worse served : But a Prince that finds himself obliged to part with a Minister, by the false Clamour of the People, and the encouraged Insolence of a Mob ; who demand that Minister without the Guilt of one single Crime proved or charged upon
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upon him, to be discarded upon their arbitrary Dictates; a Prince who complies with such Solicitation; delegates for the future all his Authority; and all the Privilege of chusing his own Servants into the Hands of a riotous Multitude, who from a Compliance of this Kind in their Prince, would think they had ever after a Right, like the *Fanizaries* in *Turkey*, to nominate his Servants, and would appoint whom they pleased to preside in the State, whilst every Minister who was employed, must look upon himself as a Creature of the Mob; not as a Minister of the King; and would be imposed on the King, or forced from him, just as the confused Clamour of the Peoples capricious Voices should ordain.

Nor, this Point of *Democracy* once obtain'd, would the Authority of a Mob stop here; from giving Servants to a Master, the natural Gradation would be; that of giving a Master too to the Servants; whilst the *Massaniellos*, *Kets*, and *Wat-Tylers* of such Rioters, *Fisker-men*, *Tanners*, and *Masens*, would have as good a Chance to sit on this

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Throne, from the sudden Choice of a heated Mob, as those great Princes; to whom the best-weighed and coolest Deliberations of the whole Legislature have given an established and just Title.

Both these Efforts therefore of the Opponents to get into Power under his Majesty, proving ineffectual, as he was neither to be deceived and cajoled, nor intimidated and driven; and the Opponents being as desperate in the Hopes they had once conceived that the next Parliament would change its Complexion, as in their Hopes of the King changing his Ministry; Rage succeeded to Policy, Resentment to Ambition, and Revenge being the only Passion they could expect to gratify, they resolved in every Shape to distress the King, to strike, in any part, at that Power they could not get to administer, and to overturn that Government in which they were not allowed to preside.

In order to compass the first of these laudable Designs, and which would facilitate the Road to the last, the Alternative was given to the People, of having

ving no Army in this Country, or such a one as should by its Independency, be *in utrumque paratus*, no readier to defend the Government, under the lawful King, than able to subvert it, to make Way for the *Pretender*. At the same Time, to weaken the Power of the Crown, and to hurt the Credit of it in every Way they could, a *Place-Bill* was to be passed, the Foundation of which was to be a Declaration, That no body who serv'd the King *could* be a Friend to his Country ; and the Effect of it to be, that no body who did serve the King, should be able to show whether he was a Friend to his Country or not ; being by this Bill to be stigmatized with an Exclusion, whilst he had any Share in the King's Service, (at least if he was a Commoner) from any Share in the Legislature.

How much obliged the Commons must be to the Proposers of this Law, by which all the great Employments must of Course be thrown into the Nobility, is foreign to my present Purpose.

The *Qualification Bill*, as it was modelled, was another wise Proposal to go hand in hand with the others, and extremely consistent with the Professions the Introdutors of it were making at the same time, in order to support the other Proposal relating to *the Commissions for Life*; for the Reason given for desiring to make the Commissions for Life was, that the Officers in Parliament might not be so dependent on the Crown, that they must there *obey the Injunctions of a Minister, or starve*; and yet at the same time a Bill is brought in that must banish every Officer out of Parliament, who, exclusive of his Commission, is in starving Circumstances.

Such Inconsistencies are urg'd in almost every part of the Conduct of these Gentlemen, when compared with any other; but as *Distress* is their principal Aim, so let one Thing be ever so inconsistent with another, provided each promotes that great End, and that the Clamour of the Day is sufficient for that Purpose, it does its Office.

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In this Manner do the opposing Party at present endeavour, in every Measure they concert, to pare from the Power of the Crown, and to represent it as one of the *Feræ Naturæ* that every one has a Right to attack, and an Interest to destroy. Whether this is done (as I have said) in order to subvert the Government, or whether this Charge on the Gentlemen who promote these Measures, and abet these Schemes, is an unjust one, I desire to be decided only by a short Review of the Doctrines inculcated this last Year by that Speaking-Trumpet of the whole Party the *Craftsman*. And if every Tenet in *that political Alcoran of a false Prophet* does not directly and evidently tend to the Subversion of the present Government, I desire to have my Truth no better thought of, than theirs ought to be, when they profess Loyalty to the King, Regard to the Quiet of the Kingdom, or a Desire to preserve the Constitution and the Liberties of *England*: But if it shall appear, that every Step taken, and every Doctrine broach'd by the *Craftsman's* Sect tends to Confusion ; I would ask any

reasonable unprejudiced Man, if Confusion in this Kingdom (no Matter how produced) could end in any Thing but the Pretender; and if the Pretender could come in that Confusion without putting an End to the present Constitution, and our Liberties?

When the *Craftsman* endeavours to exaggerate the Expences, both immediate and consequential to the Revolution; to tell the People the Blood and Treasure it has cost this Nation; does this tend to putting a Government establish'd by the Revolution, in a pleasing or a disadvantageous Light; or to making the People of *England* believe they have had a good, or a hard Bargain?

When he tells you, that the only essential Points of Liberty gain'd by the Revolution, were the Triennial-Bill, the Exempting this Country from a Standing-Army, and the Limitations annexed to the Act of Settlement; and that these three Ends have been defeated since the Accession of this Family; does he speak Truth? Or even if he did, would it be a Truth which a Friend to the Accession of this Family would have chosen to enforce?

force? What can the Conclusion from such Premises be, but that all the Blood and Treasure expended for the Revolution is thrown away; that with Regard to Liberty, we are upon the same Foot as before the Revolution; and if a Revolution was then necessary or adviseable for the Recovery of our Liberty, that the Circumstances of these Times call as loud for a Revolution now, as the Circumstances of those Times did then.

When he says, that the Act of Settlement is a Contract between the King and the People, and that whenever the King breaks any part of that Contract, the People are absolved from their Allegiance and at Liberty to chuse another; that the People are sole Judges whether that Contract be broken or not; and that the whole Nation in general now complains of the Want of Observance of it; What is and must be the Inference, but that the People now actually are absolved from any Allegiance, and at Liberty to take what King they please?

And if they are at Liberty to chuse again, In whose Favour does the *Craftsman*

man try to prejudice them, when he adopts those equally wise and loyal Sentiments of his Coadjutor Mr. *Fog*, that declare the Preservation of our Liberties is the only Thing we have to consider in the Choice of a King ; and that with Regard to our Liberties, it is a Matter altogether indifferent, whether a *Papish* or a *Protestant Prince* be upon the Throne ?

He farther adds too, in order to remove any Apprehensions People might have of Danger to the Nation in the Shock and Convulsion of a Change ; that not only *Ministers*, but even *Kings* themselves may easily be changed, and the Constitution yet remain unalter'd and unhurt.

But apart from the dutiful Regard of this Insinuation to his Majesty at this Time, if it is consider'd merely as a political Reflexion on History and Government, it proves this Author to be no more a good Commentator, than he is a good Subject, since I defy him to shew any Instance, in any History, of any Time, or in any Country, where, if the Constitution and Government of that Country, in
which

which the Revolution has happen'd, has not already been as absolute (that is as bad) as it could be, that that Revolution has not some Way or other chang'd the Constitution, either from bad to good, from good to bad, or from bad to worse; but for a Revolution, where the Government and Constitution have been good before that Revolution, and after it remain'd so, I believe such a Revolution never did happen, and in all Probability, since it never did, never will. The whole Question therefore between the *Craftsman's* Sect and the Friends to the present Government, is reducible to this Point; Whether a Revolution in this Kingdom is at this Time desirable, or not?

I have but one Question more to put to the Defenders of the *Craftsman's* Honesty, and his Followers Loyalty, and that is, whether the new Distinction he has coin'd at the End of his *metaphysical Dissertations upon Parties*, of some People being Friends to the Government but Enemies to the Constitution; and others Enemies to the Government but Friends to the Constitution, will bear any other Interpretation,

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tion, than that he means to insinuate, that the Followers of the *Pretender* are Friends to the Constitution ; and the Followers of King *George* its Enemies.

Had I been to write a Supplement to the long Jingle of extreme pretty Words put together in the *Craftsman* upon these sublimated superfine Distinctions of Friends and Enemies to the Constitution and Government, there is a third Class I should have added to the two he mentions, and that is, the Class concerned in the late *military Project*, whom I look upon to be Friends neither to the Constitution nor the Government, but equally ready to change both ; or at least so desirous to change the last, that, rather than fail in that Attempt, they would sacrifice the first.

If then a Liberty to execute such Undertakings, and gratify such Resentments, be the Liberty for which these clamorous Assertors and affected Patrons of Liberty contend : If a Liberty to dictate to the King, who shall serve him, or else to insult him without Reprehension : If a Liberty to nominate Representatives to the
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People, or else to stir them to Sedition unchastised : If a Liberty to pen every Law the two Houses of Parliament shall make, or else to represent them as a parcel of pension'd Tools and unqualify'd Hirelings, with Impunity : If a Liberty to raise Rebellions with more Facility, by rescinding the Riot-Act, and to give Rebellion a better Chance for Success, by disbanding the Troops kept up to secure on any Emergency the Peace of the State : If a Liberty to put the Nation in Confusion under the Pretence of a Spirit of Reformation : If a Liberty to expose this Kingdom, by repealing the Septennial Bill, to all those Miseries of civil Contention that now harass and afflict the unfortunate Kingdom of *Poland* ; a Liberty to make every Town in this Country like *Praage*, and every Stream like the *Vistula* ; by giving no Respite to the Heats and Animosities of contending Parties and Factions, and the Tumults of an incensed giddy Populace : If a Liberty to employ all those Hands in civil Strife, that ought to be employ'd in cultivating the Land, and to make the whole Country, one Year in three, resemble more the Madness of a Bacchanal,

than the Order of a civilized Society : If a Liberty to destroy *one Man* by Force and Clamour, whom they cannot hurt by Law or Reason : If a Liberty to encourage the Enemies of this Government by Correspondencies Abroad, and to create Enemies to it by Cabals at Home : If a Liberty for one Set of Men in this Nation, like the *Decemviri* in *Rome*, to engross to themselves the whole legislative, and executive Power in the Kingdom ; to abrogate (like those *Roman* Patriots and Reformers) all the Laws by which the State hath hitherto been govern'd, and to introduce and institute a new Body of Laws of their own : If a Liberty for these *English Decemviri* to abolish the Authority of King, Lords, and Commons, as the *Roman Decemviri* did that of Consuls, Senators, and Tribunes : In a Word, if a Liberty for a *motley amphibious Faction* to overturn a Whig-Government by Whig-principles ; or a Revolution-Government by Jacobite-principles : If such are the Liberties they want, and for which they contest, they are Liberties, which I believe these Gentlemen will never be allow'd ; and Liberties, which when-ever they

they take, I hope, they will be made to repent, in the only Way that bad and vitiated Minds are capable of repenting, which is by being punished for the Attempt.

The second Point I propos'd to consider in this Paper, was the Liberty now enjoy'd in this Country, compared with any Æra the most noted for the quiet and prosperous Enjoyment of Liberty that can be mark'd out in the *English* History ; but the Variety of Matter arising on the first Head, has already protracted this Dissertation into so great a Length, that I shall not now enter upon the other, but give it in a few Days supplementally in a distinct Paper.

I shall add nothing more at present, but to say, I hope I have kept within the Bounds I at first prescribed my self, with Regard to my Manner of Writing, though I have exceeded them with Regard to the Length. I hope I have misstated no Fact ; I am sure I have reflected on no particular Person ; and if in speaking of whole Classes, Factions,
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and Parties of Men; if in delineating Measures, Schemes, and Projects, the Colours may seem too thick, or grossly laid on, or the Lines too strong, or coarsely drawn; all I can say is, that in describing Vice, it is impossible to make it look like Virtue, or in painting Deformity, to represent it like Beauty.



F I N I S.

